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Dairy Policy Analysis Alliance 
 
 
The Dairy Policy Analysis Alliance is a cooperative dairy policy research and outreach program between the Food 
and Agricultural Policy Research Institute at the University of Missouri and the Department of Agricultural and 
Applied Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison 
 
 
Dairy Policy Briefs 
 
To enhance understanding of dairy policy issues that will be considered as part of the 2007 Farm Bill 
debate, the Dairy Policy Analysis Alliance has prepared the attached set of one-page briefs.  These briefs 
have a common format, first explaining a specific dairy program or concept then outlining some related 
public policy issues. 
 
It is important to emphasize that that these briefs provide basic, simplified explanations of complex 
programs, necessarily omitting many details.  Readers interested in more comprehensive coverage are 
encouraged to access the reference papers noted below.  These and other related papers and web sites 
can be electronically downloaded/accessed at either the FAPRI website (http://www.fapri.missouri.edu/) 
or at the University of Wisconsin Understanding Dairy Markets website (http://www.aae.wisc.edu/future/).   
 
 
Briefing Paper No. & Title                                      Reference Paper 
1. Milk Price Support Program Basic Milk Pricing Concepts for Dairy Farmers 
 
2. MILC USDA, Farm Service Agency Fact Sheet: Milk Income Loss 
Contract Program 
3. Target Price/Deficiency Payments Implications of a Target Price-Deficiency Payment Program for 
Supporting Milk Prices 
4. Voluntary Supply management National Milk Producers Federation CWT web site: 
http://www.cwt.coop/ 
5. Marketing quotas Use of Mandatory Supply Control in the U.S. Dairy Sector 
6. Dairy Compacts State Milk Marketing Order Regulation and Interstate Dairy 
Compacts 
7. Milk Protein Concentrate Imports Milk Protein Concentrates: What We Know and Don’t Know 
8a – 8d. Trade/WTO issues: Potential Impacts on U.S. Agriculture of the U.S. October 2005 
WTO Proposal;  U.S. Dairy Trade Situation and Outlook 
9a – 9d. Federal Milk Marketing Orders Basic Milk Pricing Concepts for Dairy Farmers; Federal Milk 
Marketing Order Pooling, Depooling, and Distant Pooling: 
Issues and Impacts 
 
If you have questions about the material in these briefing papers or would like additional information, 
please contact FAPRI or UW-Madison affiliates at the following phone numbers or email addresses: 
 
Scott Brown  (573)882-3861  browndo@missouri.edu 
Tom Cox  (608)262-9493  tcox@wisc.edu 
Bob Cropp  (608)262-9483  racropp@wisc.edu 
Brian Gould  (608)263-3212  bwgould@wisc.edu 
Ed Jesse  (608)262-6348  evjesse@wisc.edu
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The Dairy Policy Analysis Alliance is a cooperative dairy policy research and outreach program between the Food 
and Agricultural Policy Research Institute at the University of Missouri and the Department of Agricultural and 
Applied Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison 
 
Dairy Policy Brief #1: Milk Price Support Program 
 
What is the Program? 
 
The Milk Price Support Program (MPSP) has been a fixture of U.S. dairy policy since 1949.  It is a market 
intervention program, meaning that the government offers to purchase non-perishable dairy products 
(butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk) from manufacturers at specified (intervention) prices.  The program 
is dormant when market prices are above intervention prices.  It is activated when the overall milk supply 
exceeds demand, causing excess milk to be diverted into production of nonperishable products and 
lowering their prices. The product intervention prices are linked to a price support level for manufacturing 
milk that is set by Congress. The milk support price is currently $9.90 per hundredweight for milk of 
average butterfat content; $9.80 for milk testing 3.5 percent butterfat. 
 
What are the issues? 
 
• Ineffective price floor.  The MPSP has not always been successful in keeping milk price above the 
support level.  Because of non-standard product, packaging, and payment specifications, it costs more 
to sell products to the government than to commercial buyers.  So market prices for the products 
purchased under the MPSP sometimes fall below intervention prices, causing milk prices to fall below 
support.  This has led to a call by many dairy groups to raise the intervention prices.   Others have 
proposed that the milk price safety net be made more solid by flooring the product prices used in 
federal milk marketing order pricing formulas at the intervention prices or replacing the MPSP with 
direct payments to farmers when market prices fall below a specified level. 
 
• Incompatibility with world trade liberalization.  The MPSP is a big contributor to the U.S. aggregate 
measure of support (AMS), which the World Trade Organization (WTO) uses to gauge trade-distorting 
domestic agricultural subsidies.  The U.S. AMS is limited under our commitments to the WTO and the 
limit will very likely be reduced as part of ongoing negotiations.  Major changes in the MPSP—or 
termination—may be necessary to conform to a new WTO agreement. 
 
• Market price distortions.  The MPSP has affected milk utilization by setting a price floor for some 
commodities but not for others.  The best example of this market distortion relates to nonfat dry milk, 
which is a source of dairy protein in many food applications.  There is a large U.S. market for other 
dairy-based proteins, notably milk protein concentrate (MPC) and casein.  Nearly all MPC and casein 
used in the U.S. comes from imports.  Because nonfat dry milk is purchased under the MPSP, it is more 
profitable and less risky to produce nonfat dry milk than other forms of dairy proteins. 
 
• Difficulty in adjusting butter and nonfat dry milk prices.  The MPSP has, at times, resulted in large 
government purchases of nonfat dry milk even though the market price for milk was well above the 
support price.  In setting butter and nonfat dry milk purchase prices, USDA assumes that the two 
products are produced jointly.  Therefore, the sum of the net (of assumed manufacturing costs) value of 
butter and nonfat dry milk contained in a hundredweight of milk must equal the support price for milk.  
The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to adjust relative prices of butter and nonfat dry milk (called a 
butter-powder tilt) twice a year to minimize purchase costs and prevent a build-up of stocks of either 
product.  But political pressures have limited the ability of the Secretary to make timely price 
adjustments. 
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The Dairy Policy Analysis Alliance is a cooperative dairy policy research and outreach program between the Food 
and Agricultural Policy Research Institute at the University of Missouri and the Department of Agricultural and 
Applied Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison 
 
Dairy Policy Brief #2: Milk Income Loss Contract Program 
 
What is the Program? 
 
The Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program was included in the Farm Security and Rural Investment 
Act of 2002 (2002 farm bill) and is a type of target price/deficiency payment program that makes a direct 
payment to dairy producers when milk prices fall below a specified trigger level.  This program includes a 
payment limit feature that limits the amount of a producer’s annual milk sales eligible for MILC payments.  
The 2002 farm bill authorized the MILC program through September 30, 2005.  Subsequently, the MILC 
program has been reauthorized through August 31, 2007 under the Agricultural Reconciliation Act of 
2005 (ARA2005).  The USDA has labeled this extension as MILCX.  The MILC program costs totaled 
$2.026 billion and the March 2006 Congressional Budget Office baseline estimates the cost of MILCX at 
$969 million. 
 
What are the issues? 
 
• Soft price floor. The MILC direct payment rate under the 2002 farm bill was calculated as 45 percent 
of the difference between $16.94 per hundredweight and the Boston Class I Price.  The extension 
included in ARA2005 lowered the payout to 34 percent.  MILC does not create a floor on receipts, since 
when payments are made, the payment rate compensates only part of the actual decline in milk prices.  
Other dairy target price/deficiency payment approaches that have been discussed generally propose a 
more solid price floor at a level lower than what is set under the MILC program. 
 
• Production caps.  Participating producers in the MILC program are eligible to receive a direct payment 
on their first 2.4 million pounds of production in a fiscal year.  The production cap feature of the MILC 
program has proven to be a very effective way to limit program payments. But targeting of benefits to 
small dairy producers has made this program unpopular with large dairy producers and in areas of the 
country dominated by large dairies.  Using the 2005 average U.S. milk yield of 19,537 pounds per cow, 
only dairy farms with fewer than 123 dairy cows are eligible for MILC payments on all milk sold.  As milk 
yields and dairy operation sizes grow, the percentage of annual U.S. milk production eligible for full 
MILC payments declines.  Based on changes in the distribution of dairy operations by size, the amount 
of milk eligible for full MILC payments has fallen by nearly 10 percent since the program was initiated in 
December 2001. 
 
• Milk supply impact. The MILC program tends to lengthen periods of low milk prices.  That’s because 
program payments supplement dairy income to keep some producers—especially small farmers—in 
business when they might otherwise have exited dairying.  FAPRI estimated that, on an annual basis, 
the MILC program reduced Class III milk prices $0.25 per hundredweight.  Raising the production cap 
would further lengthen periods of low prices. 
 
• Future extensions.  Because the program is not authorized for the life of the 2002 farm bill, 
expenditures under the MILC program are not extended in current federal budget outlay estimates.  
This means that continuation of the MILC program in any form would likely require either more money 
to be budgeted for agricultural spending or for money to be taken from other agricultural commodity 
programs to fund MILC. One issue surrounding the MILC program arises as Congress discusses the 
idea of extending provisions of the 2002 farm bill until the current WTO round ends: an extension would 
not automatically extend the MILC program like other agricultural provisions contained in the 2002 farm 
bill. 
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The Dairy Policy Analysis Alliance is a cooperative dairy policy research and outreach program between the Food 
and Agricultural Policy Research Institute at the University of Missouri and the Department of Agricultural and 
Applied Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison 
 
Dairy Policy Brief #3: Target Price-deficiency Payments 
 
What is the Program? 
 
Target price-deficiency payment programs involve the government making direct payments to dairy 
farmers whenever the market price (reference price) falls short of a pre-announced price level (target 
price).  The current Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program is an example.  For MILC, the reference 
price is the Class I price in Boston and the target price is $16.94 per hundredweight.  In any month the 
Boston Class I price is less than $16.94, all eligible milk marketed receives a payment of 34 percent of 
the difference. A permanent dairy target price-deficiency payment program would likely replace the 
current Milk Price Support Program (MPSP).  Consequently, wholesale dairy product prices would be 
allowed to seek market clearing levels.   But if the farm milk price falls below the target price, dairy 
farmers would receive a direct payment to make up the difference. 
 
What are the issues? 
 
• Target price. In theory, the target price could be set at any level, but the higher the target price the 
higher the probability that farm milk prices will consistently fall below the target.  This would make the 
program income enhancing rather than counter-cyclical, perhaps resulting in burdensome government 
costs. A target price for manufacturing milk in the $10.00 to $10.50 per hundredweight range would not 
consistently enhance dairy farmer income.  At the same time, it would provide dairy farmers a higher 
safety net than the $9.90 support level under the current MPSP.  
 
• Payment limits. Target price-deficiency payments can be targeted to smaller dairy farmers, if that is a 
policy objective. This can be achieved by limiting direct payments to a maximum quantity of milk 
marketed by an individual producer, as is done under MILC.  Alternatively, dollar-based payment 
limitations can be applied, as is done in crop programs. Payment limits are objectionable to larger 
farmers, but they can control government costs.  
 
• Taxpayer and manufacturer burden. Unlike the MPSP, which floors wholesale prices for butter, 
cheese, and nonfat dry milk, a pure target price-deficiency payment program would allow product prices 
to fall as far as necessary to clear markets during periods of milk surplus. This could result in product 
prices well below the MPSP floors. Consumers would benefit to the extent that lower wholesale prices 
are reflected in retail prices.  But, taxpayers would bear the cost of deficiency payments. And even 
though farmers are protected by deficiency payments, their cooperatives and other processors could 
periodically face very low returns to manufacturing and greater product price instability. 
 
• WTO scoring. The MPSP is an “amber box” domestic price support program under WTO rules, and 
contributes about 25 percent of the U.S.’s permitted aggregate measure of support (AMS).  WTO’s 
AMS calculation uses the difference between the $9.90 per hundredweight support price and a world 
$7.25 reference price times the quantity of milk marketed. Only actual government expenditures would 
be counted under a target price-deficiency payment program.   
 
• Dairy product innovation. Replacing the MPSP with direct payments would result in lower market 
prices for milk during periods of milk surpluses.  This would challenge dairy manufacturers to be more 
innovative in product development and marketing. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #4: Voluntary Supply Management 
 
What is the program? 
 
In the mid-1980s, Congress authorized two major voluntary dairy supply management programs, both 
funded in part through dairy farmer assessments. Under the 1984-85 Milk Diversion Program, dairy 
farmers who reduced their milk marketings 5 to 30 percent from a base level were paid $10 per 
hundredweight on the reduced marketings. This was followed in 1987 by the Dairy Termination Program 
(Whole Herd Buyout), under which the government accepted bids from dairy farmers who were willing to 
slaughter all female dairy cattle and remain out of the dairy business for at least 5 years.  The Milk 
Diversion Program cut milk production sharply in 1985, but had no long-term effect.  The Whole herd 
buyout was more successful in moderating production trends, but the induced slaughter of dairy cows 
negatively affected beef markets, raising the ire of cattle producers. 
 
The objective of these government-sponsored voluntary supply management programs was to enhance 
and stabilize farm-level milk prices by controlling the amount of milk marketed.  Recently, an industry-
sponsored voluntary milk supply management program was initiated to achieve the same objectives by 
using some of the same techniques.   The program, labeled CWT for Cooperatives Working Together, 
was designed and is managed by the National Milk Producers Federation, a trade association of dairy 
cooperatives. Members of participating dairy cooperatives and, if they choose, independent dairy farmers 
fund the program through an assessment of ten cents per hundredweight of milk marketed.  Currently, 
CWT has two methods of supply management: herd retirement and dairy export incentives. Under herd 
retirement, bids are accepted from dairy farmers who are willing to slaughter their milking herd. Export 
incentives provide participating cooperatives subsidies on exports of butter and cheese. 
 
What are the issues? 
 
• Adequate funding and participation. Government supply management programs are funded from 
mandatory producer assessments and/or federal appropriations.  But funding for industry-sponsored 
programs like CWT depends on voluntary assessments.  At issue is whether participation and the 
associated funds raised are sufficient to enhance and stabilize farm level milk prices over the long run. 
 
• Free riders.  Voluntary supply management programs have a potential free rider problem—dairy 
farmers who don’t participate in the program still receive any benefits that result from the participation of 
others. Moreover, to the extent voluntary supply management is successful, some dairy farmers are 
likely to respond to higher and more stable prices by expanding the size of their dairy herd.  This makes 
it difficult for a voluntary program to be successful over the long run. 
 
• Buying air. Voluntary supply management programs run the risk of buying air; for example, paying 
farmers to get out of the dairy business when they were already planning to retire. But there still may be 
benefits if the program requires milk cows to be slaughtered rather than sold to another dairy farmer. 
 
• Export market issues. The export incentive element of CWT not only moves dairy products from the 
domestic market, it can also provide valuable export experience for dairy cooperatives. However, since 
export subsidies are only offered when dairy product prices are depressed, international customers may 
view participating dairy cooperatives as an unreliable source of dairy products.  There is also a question 
regarding whether CWT export subsidies violate World Trade Organization rules.  While they are not 
government subsidies, some believe they could trigger an objection if they become large enough. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #5: Marketing Quotas 
 
What is the Program? 
 
Marketing quotas specify the maximum amount of milk that individual dairy farmers can sell, usually 
applying stiff economic penalties to any sales in excess of the assigned farm quota.  The policy intent is 
to achieve a price goal by closely matching total milk supply with the total amount of milk demanded at 
the price objective.  If this goal is achieved, then the government does not need to purchase surplus milk 
to support prices because no surplus is produced.  Likewise, there is no need for government payments 
to farmers to support income because farmers receive sufficient revenue from the marketplace.  
 
Milk quotas have been used for many years in Canada and the European Union (EU).  Quotas have 
never been used directly for dairy in the United States.  But there were programs in the 1980s that 
operated like quotas in that dairy farmers who marketed more milk than during a specified base period 
were penalized through an assessment on current marketings.   
 
What are the issues? 
 
• Marketing quotas can enhance farm milk prices without large government costs.  Quotas do not 
require large treasury outlays because there are no government purchases or direct payments to 
farmers.  Relatively high milk price levels can be achieved, as evidenced by farm milk prices in Canada 
compared to those in the U.S.  In the 2004-05 marketing year (August-July), the Canadian weighted 
average farm milk price was about $24.30 per hundredweight (converted to U.S. dollars).  The U.S. all-
milk price for 2005 was $15.15 per hundredweight.  Price enhancement under the EU quota system has 
been substantially less because the EU quotas are less restrictive. 
 
• The value of marketing quotas is capitalized and raises production costs.  To the extent that 
quotas are successful in raising prices above what they would be without them, the difference is 
capitalized in the value of the quota (if it is transferable) or the farm to which the quota is attached.  
Under the Canadian system, quota is fully fungible and traded through formal provincial exchanges.  In 
March 2006, quota sufficient to cover the production of one average cow for a year was trading for 
about $25,000 (U.S. dollars) in Ontario and Quebec, the major Canadian dairy provinces.  The cost of 
quota is a major capital cost to farmers who want to enter the industry or expand their dairy operation. 
 
• Quotas interfere with efficient industry changes. Depending on how they are applied, quotas can 
impede or prevent structural change in the dairy industry.  Quotas that cannot be easily transferred can 
lock in herd size structure within regions and prevent inter-regional shifts in milk production that would 
increase industry efficiency.  Quotas that raise milk and dairy product prices significantly above those in 
other countries must be accompanied by high tariffs to keep out imports. This interferes with trade 
liberalization objectives. 
 
• Quotas can encourage dairy substitutes. Marketing quotas used to raise prices above competitive 
levels can create consumer resistance.  Milk and dairy product consumption is reduced and substitutes 
displace dairy consumption 
 
• Quotas are difficult and expensive to administer.   Dairy farmers need to be dealt with individually in 
allocating quotas and there can be difficult issues of equity in the allocation process.  Individual farm 
production levels must be monitored to assure compliance.   
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Dairy Policy Brief #6: Dairy Compacts 
 
Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact 
 
The Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact (NIDC) was authorized for the six New England states in Section 
147 of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (1996 farm bill).  The legislation 
required the Secretary of Agriculture to find “compelling public interest” in the compact region before 
these states were given the authority to implement the compact. After some unsuccessful legal 
challenges (primarily to the compelling public interest finding), the compact began collecting over-order 
obligations in July 1997.  The over-order obligation per hundredweight was calculated each month as 
($16.94 – Boston class I price).  Processors paid this over-order obligation to dairy farm operators or their 
cooperatives.  Higher milk costs were passed onto consumers in the form of higher retail prices.  The 
1996 farm bill required that the compact commission could only regulate Class I milk and thus excluded 
milk used for manufacturing purposes. The NIDC commission was required to pay $1.8 million in 1998 to 
compensate the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) for the additional cost of the milk price support 
program that resulted when the regional rate of milk production grew faster than the U.S. rate. The 
authorizing legislation as amended specified an end date for the NIDC of September 30, 2001. 
 
Other Compact Legislation 
 
Other attempts have been made to enact dairy compacts in the U.S.  As the NIDC was ending in 2001, 
there were attempts to broaden the compact areas by including a southern region.  In fact, many southern 
states passed necessary state-level legislation to participate in a dairy compact.  The National Dairy 
Equity Act (NDEA) of 2003 included provisions for five compact regions that covered the entire U.S.  It 
also allowed regions with low Cass I utilization (less than 45 percent) to receive government payments in 
an attempt to make the program more equitable across regions.   
 
What are the issues with compacts? 
 
• Effect on milk prices. The NIDC was unpopular outside of the compact area due to concerns about its 
indirect effects on manufactured milk prices.  NIDC payments likely encouraged more milk production in 
the compact area than would have occurred without the program.  To the extent that the over-order 
payments collected by the NIDC were passed forward in the form of higher consumer milk prices, the 
NIDC likely reduced fluid use in the compact area. Both of these factors would have driven more milk to 
the manufacturing sector and lowered manufactured milk prices across the country.  Because of the 
limited geographical scope of the NIDC, these effects were likely quite small. 
 
• Consumer versus taxpayer transfers to dairy producers. The NIDC was a unique dairy policy in 
that there was an explicit assessment on consumers to compensate dairy producers when prices 
dropped below target levels. As alternative dairy polices are considered, the dairy industry needs to 
debate whether programs like the NIDC that tax consumers are a better alternative than programs that 
use taxpayer funds. 
 
• The NIDC counted in the U.S. domestic support notification to the WTO. The NIDC was included in 
the U.S. domestic support notification to the WTO at a level of $103 million over the 1998 to 2001 
period.  This amount roughly equaled producer payments under the NIDC.  New compact programs 
would likely also be included in our domestic support notifications. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #7: Milk Protein Concentrate Imports 
 
What is Milk Protein Concentrate? 
 
Milk Protein Concentrate (MPC) is a non-fat, high-protein milk powder that is made by ultrafiltration and 
drying of skim milk.  It has similar uses to nonfat dry milk (NDM), which is typically produced by spray-
drying skim milk, but has a higher protein content—40 to 90 percent compared to 34 to 36 percent for 
NDM.  Because of its higher protein and correspondingly lower lactose relative to NDM, the use of MPC 
to “standardize” cheese milk (optimize the fat-to-casein ratio) enhances both the economics and the 
technical efficiency of cheesemaking.  MPC can only be used in making cheeses and cheese foods that 
do not have a U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) standard of identity. But MPC is also an 
ingredient in a wide array of other food products such as frozen deserts, bakery and confectionery 
products, sports and nutrition drinks and bars (energy bars), and nutrition supplements.   
 
Until recently, there was no MPC produced in the United States, and there is only a token tariff (0.17 
cents per pound) on imported MPC.  Consequently, as the demand for MPC has increased because of its 
functionality and low price per unit of protein relative to NDM, U.S. imports have soared.  The U.S. 
imported less than 10 million pounds of MPC in the early 1990’s.  Imports in 2005 were 172 million 
pounds valued at $223 million, comprising nearly 10 percent of the total value of U.S. dairy imports.  
 
To the extent that they substitute for each other, imported MPC has caused displacement of domestically-
produced NDM.  This has provoked calls by dairy producer groups to limit MPC imports.  Bills have been 
introduced in the last two Congressional sessions to impose tariff rate quotas on MPC and casein 
imports.  The current Senate and House bills are S. 1417 and H.R. 521, both titled the Milk Import Tariff 
Equity Act. 
 
What are the Issues? 
 
• Why isn’t more MPC made in the United States? MPC imports are partly due to the lack of 
economic incentives to produce it domestically.  Put simply, the MPSP sets an intervention price for 
NDM that makes it more profitable to manufacture NDM than MPC. 
 
• How much NDM does MPC displace and how are producer prices affected?  Displacement of 
NDM by MPC is hard to measure because of the lack of hard evidence on substitutability in many 
applications, especially newer products that have always used MPC.  UW research estimated that the 
maximum displacement ranged from 80 to 430 million pounds of NDM annually between 1997 and 
2002.  Government purchases of NDM exceeded its estimated displacement by MPC in each of these 
years.  In other words, the government would have purchased NDM under the MPSP even if there had 
been no MPC imports.  Consequently, the producer price effect was minimal.  Record U.S. exports of 
NDM in response to strong world market prices in 2004 and 2005 resulted in no government 
purchases, and expanded MPC imports were used to supplement NDM supplies. 
 
• What are the consequences of imposing tariff rate quotas on MPC imports?  Under WTO rules, 
the U.S. has limited flexibility in applying new tariffs and must compensate countries that would be 
penalized by expanding tariffs beyond what were agreed to under the Uruguay round.  The nature of 
compensation is subject to negotiation.  It could be a cash settlement for lost exports.  More likely, it 
would involve raising tariff-rate quotas or lowering the over-quota tariff on other dairy products the 
country exported to the U.S. This would probably be cheese, which is a major export item for most 
countries that export MPC to the U.S. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #8a: The Doha Round of the WTO 
 
What is the process and where does the round currently stand? 
 
The current WTO round was formally initiated with a declaration in November 2001 during a ministerial 
meeting held in Doha, Qatar.  The agricultural negotiations had started months earlier under the 
Agreement on Agriculture.  Since the Doha declaration, ministerials have been held in Cancun in 2003, 
Geneva in 2004 and Hong Kong in 2005.  There are currently 149 member countries in the WTO.  
 
An April 30, 2006 deadline for deciding some key details in the agricultural negotiations was missed and a 
planned ministerial meeting postponed.  A July 31, 2006 deadline is still in effect for draft schedules of the 
next WTO agreement to be submitted.  This deadline will be difficult to meet given that many of the 
details for a successful agricultural agreement are not worked out.  A factor heightening the need to 
complete an agreement quickly is that the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA, or “fast-track”), under which 
Congress granted the Bush administration unilateral authority to approve trade pacts, ends in mid-2007.  
 
The three “pillars” included in the WTO agricultural negotiations. 
 
• Domestic support. The existing Uruguay round WTO agreement and current Doha round negotiations 
include reductions in trade-distorting domestic support levels, classified by the WTO as “amber box” 
spending.  Using the WTO accounting framework for counting domestic support called the Aggregate 
Measure of Support (AMS), the U.S. has a current cap of $19.1 billion.  Proposals under the Doha 
round negotiations have suggested significant cuts in current AMS levels for many countries.  The U.S. 
Doha round proposal offered in October 2005 would have made a 60 percent cut in the U.S. AMS cap.  
For the U.S. dairy industry, the Milk Price Support Program (MPSP) currently counts over $4.5 billion 
towards the overall AMS level and would likely require modification or even termination under these 
proposed AMS reductions. 
 
• Market Access.  All non-tariff barriers were eliminated or converted to tariffs under the Uruguay round 
agreement.  In certain cases, Tariff-Rate Quotas (TRQs) were created to allow some level of minimum 
access.  No trade would have occurred without these TRQs since many over-quota tariffs remained 
prohibitively high.  The focus of the Doha round has been on how to reduce these high over-quota 
tariffs, the administration of TRQs and what special safeguard provisions might exist to protect certain 
domestic sectors.  Some Doha proposals have focused on reducing the highest tariff levels the most to 
achieve a closer balance in tariffs around the world.  Further increases in market access through larger 
TRQs are included in some Doha proposals.  Many developing countries are focused on what special 
treatment they may obtain in order to protect their agricultural sectors so they can develop and be able 
to compete in a global economy. 
 
• Export Subsidies. The Uruguay round WTO agreement set out reductions in the quantity and 
expenditure levels of subsidized agricultural exports.  The Hong Kong declaration includes references 
to complete elimination of export subsidies by 2013.  For the U.S. dairy industry, the Dairy Export 
Incentive Program (DEIP) would need to be adjusted to be in compliance with export subsidy 
reductions made in a Doha round agreement.  Current levels of dairy products that can be exported 
under the DEIP are:  butter and butteroil, 21,097 metric tons; skim milk powder, 68,201 metric tons; and 
cheese, 3,030 metric tons.  Other issues included in the area of export subsidies are food aid, export 
credit guarantees, and state trading enterprises. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #8b: WTO Market Access Issues  
 
Market Access Provisions of the Uruguay Round 
 
Prior to the Uruguay Round Agricultural Agreement (URAA) many agricultural product imports were 
restricted by quotas or other types of non-tariff instruments.  The Uruguay round converted all non-tariff 
barriers into tariff equivalents in a process called “tariffication.”  This process attempted to create a tariff 
that would leave the ratio of the internal price to world price unchanged from what existed under the non-
tariff instrument.  Besides the conversion of non-tariff barriers, the URAA ensured that access to markets 
did not decline under tariffication by the introduction of tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) that had a lower in-quota 
tariff rate.  The tariffs established under the URAA were then cut on average by 36 percent (at least 15 
percent for each product) over five years (1995-2000) for developed countries and by 24 percent (at least 
10 percent for each product) over ten years (1995-2004) for developing countries.  Least developed 
countries were not required to make tariff cuts under the URAA.  There were special safeguard provisions 
in the URAA that allowed governments to take action in cases of rapidly declining prices or for surges in 
imports.  The URAA set the stage for future trade rounds to deal more easily with market access issues 
since market access became increasingly transparent with non-tariff barriers removed. 
 
Market Access Proposals in the Doha Round 
 
Although agricultural products are now only protected by tariffs, many tariffs remain at levels that are high 
enough to prevent meaningful market access.  The numerous proposals on market access reform under 
the Doha round have called for further reductions in tariffs in an effort to achieve greater progress in 
expanding agricultural trade.  Early in the Doha round, some countries proposed that cuts in tariffs should 
not be from the URAA bound rates but from applied tariff rates.  In many cases, the applied rates are well 
below their respective bound rates, so there is no additional market access opportunity until the bound 
rate is reduced to below the applied rate.  There are many other issues related to tariff reductions that 
range from domestic food security to tariff escalation that occurs in an attempt to protect processing 
industries.  There have been many different proposals offered to cut tariffs.  They all differ in the degree in 
which they attempt to equalize tariffs over time.  The Swiss formula, for example, provides for a narrow 
range of final tariffs and a maximum final tariff rate.  The latest Doha proposals have looked at bands that 
cut the largest tariffs by the largest percentage and smaller tariffs by a smaller percentage in an attempt 
to harmonize rates.  Further market access issues identified in the Doha round include tariff quotas, tariff 
quota administration, special safeguards and state trading enterprises.   
 
What are important market access issues for the U.S. dairy industry? 
 
• Additional dairy products will enter the U.S. Under most Doha proposals, additional U.S. market 
access for most dairy products will occur.  This will tend to lower U.S. prices.  Perhaps more important 
will be reductions in U.S. tariffs that will allow products like butter to flow more easily into the U.S. when 
domestic prices are high. This will tend to cut the extreme peaks that have characterized butter markets 
over the past few years. 
 
• Additional market access will raise world dairy prices. There is considerable evidence that 
additional global market access achieved by a successful Doha round agreement would increase world 
dairy prices to levels closer to current U.S. prices.  This would minimize the negative effects of 
expanded market access on the U.S. dairy sector and could even cause U.S. milk prices to increase 
because of expanded export opportunities.  
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Dairy Policy Brief #8c: WTO Export Subsidy Issues  
 
Export Subsidy Provisions of the Uruguay Round 
 
The Uruguay Round Agricultural Agreement (URAA) prohibits export subsidies on agricultural products 
unless they are specified in a country’s commitment list.  Products included on a country’s commitment 
list were required to be cut from base period (1986-1990) levels in both volume and value terms.  
Developed countries were required to cut the value by 36 percent and the volume by 24 percent in equal 
increments over the 1995 to 2000 period.  Developing countries were required to cut the value by 24 
percent and the volume by 14 percent in equal increments over the 1995 to 2004 period.  Least 
developed countries were not required to make any cuts.  There are 25 WTO members who are able to 
use export subsidies, but even these countries can only use subsidies for products listed in their URAA 
commitments. 
 
Export Subsidy Elimination in the Doha Round 
 
The Hong Kong agreement calls for the elimination of all export subsidies, including export credit 
programs, by 2013.  Some proposals have sought a large cut in export subsidies early in the agreement 
period, followed by an adjustment period before elimination of all subsidies.  Other proposals allow 
greater flexibility in the use of export subsidies for developing countries.  Smaller developing countries 
who import much of their food are seeking less aggressive cuts to subsidies, fearing that large reductions 
could affect food costs for their consumers.  Although there is general agreement to continue to promote 
food aid for humanitarian purposes, there are concerns about how to properly discipline food aid so that it 
is not used by countries to primarily rid themselves of burdensome surpluses. The role of state trading 
enterprises and differences that exist relative to private companies is also a point of contention under the 
export subsidy debate.  
 
What are important export subsidy issues for the U.S. dairy industry? 
 
• The Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP) will be less important to the U.S. dairy industry under 
a Doha round agreement. The URAA required cuts in the levels of dairy products that could be 
exported under the DEIP.  Current levels of dairy products that can be exported under the DEIP are:  
butter and butteroil, 21,097 metric tons; skim milk powder, 68,201 metric tons; and cheese, 3,030 
metric tons.  Annual DEIP commitments begin on a July 1 year.  With further cuts in allowable DEIP 
exports, the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) will see a larger increase in stocks during periods of 
surplus production. 
 
• The Doha round reduction of dairy export subsidies by the European Union is critical. The larger 
issue under the export subsidy pillar for the U.S. dairy industry is not the reduction in the DEIP, but the 
likely effect on dairy product prices of fewer subsidized exports from other countries.  World dairy prices 
should rise as a result of cutting export subsidies.  Analysis conducted by FAPRI examining the U.S. 
proposal of October 2005 suggested that the cut in EU subsidized exports would be large enough to 
increase world dairy prices to U.S. levels.  This would limit the downside negative effects of changes in 
U.S. domestic support and market access for dairy products.  Without export subsidy reductions, the 
U.S. proposal would be negative for the U.S. dairy industry. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #8d: WTO Domestic Support Issues  
 
Domestic Support Provisions of the Uruguay Round 
 
The main issue surrounding domestic support programs is their tendency to stimulate domestic 
production, thus squeezing out imports.  Domestic supports may also provide motivation for a country to 
use export subsidies to move excess product, lowering world prices. In the Uruguay Round Agricultural 
Agreement (URAA) a distinction was made between domestic support policies that stimulate production 
and distort trade and programs that have only minimal effects on trade.  This categorization resulted in 
the creation of colored “boxes” to represent the different types of domestic support.  Using a traffic light 
analogy, the green box is used for domestic support that has minimal trade effects and can be used 
freely.  Examples of programs that fall into this category are: research, infrastructure and payments to 
farmers that do not stimulate production.  Domestic support that has a direct effect on production and 
trade was put into an amber box and was to be cut under the URAA.  Payments made to farmers that 
required limiting production to be eligible were defined in the URAA to fall within the blue box and did not 
require reductions. The URAA constructed a set of rules that countries must use to calculate a value of 
the total domestic support each country provides producers.  This calculation became a country’s 
aggregate measure of support (AMS).  Each country had to calculate its base period (1986-1998) AMS 
and agree to make cuts from that base period level.  Developed countries had to cut their AMS by 20 
percent over the 1995-2000 period while developing countries had to cut their AMS by 13 percent over 
the 1995-2004 period.  For the U.S., the base period AMS was $23.879 billion and the required 20 
percent URAA reduction resulted in an AMS ceiling in 2000 of $19.103 billion. There are 34 WTO 
members who have commitments to reduce amber box spending in the URAA.  The remaining WTO 
members must keep domestic support within 5 percent of the value of production (10 percent for 
developing countries). 
 
Domestic Support Proposals in the Doha Round 
 
There have been several proposals in the Doha round for reforms to domestic support.  In nearly all 
cases, the proposals have focused on further reductions or outright elimination of amber box spending.  
The U.S. proposal called for a 60 percent cut in domestic support which results in a U.S. AMS ceiling 
below $8 billion.  Other issues continue to be debated regarding matters like de minimis rules and further 
refinement of both the green and blue box definitions.  Some countries worry about box shifting as 
countries reduce amber box spending but offset that decline with green box or blue box spending. 
 
What are important domestic support issues for the U.S. dairy industry? 
 
• A Doha round agreement will likely cause Milk Price Support Program (MPSP) reform. The 
current AMS calculation for the MPSP exceeds $4.5 billion.  It is difficult to see how the dairy industry 
could use up over one-half of the total U.S. AMS level resulting from the proposed U.S. AMS 
reductions.  The agreed-to AMS calculation for the MPSP (similar to all price support programs) is:  Milk 
Production times (Milk Support Price minus Reference Period World Milk Price [$7.25]). 
 
• Other dairy programs will count in the amber box.  The Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact was 
included in the U.S. domestic support notifications and suggests that new compact-like programs will 
also fall into the amber box. Although the U.S. has not provided any domestic support notifications 
since 2001, once notifications have been made for the period during which the Milk Income Loss 
Contract (MILC) program operated, it will also fall into the AMS calculation. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #9a:  Federal Milk Marketing Orders  
                                     
What are federal milk marketing orders? 
 
Federal milk marketing orders (FMMOs) require regulated milk processors, called handlers, to pay 
minimum prices for milk and adhere to other specified rules.  FMMOs are authorized under the 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended.  Since the legislation is enabling, producers 
must request initiation or amendment of an order and grant approval of proposals through a referendum. 
This is often done through dairy cooperatives representing their membership.  Upon producer approval 
(dairy cooperatives may bloc vote for their members), the Secretary issues the order, which is then 
binding on handlers within the affected marketing area; that is, handlers—not dairy producers—are 
regulated. The marketing area is a specified geographical region within which processors compete with 
each other for sales of fluid (beverage) milk to various retail and institutional outlets; not necessarily 
where producers shipping to these processors are located. 
 
There are 10 federal milk marketing orders, affecting about 60 percent of all milk marketed in the U.S.  
California’s state order, which operates much like federal orders, accounts for another 20 percent.  The 
rest is priced under other state orders or is not subject to FMMO regulation (primarily Grade B milk). 
 
According to the USDA, the three major objectives of FMMOs are to: (1) assure consumers of an 
adequate supply of wholesome milk at a reasonable price; (2) promote greater producer price stability 
and orderly marketing; and (3) provide adequate producer prices to ensure an adequate current and 
future Grade A milk supply. 
 
What are the Issues? 
 
The objectives of FMMOs are achieved through classified pricing, pooling, and setting minimum producer 
pay prices. There are a number of controversial issues related to how these methods are employed.  
These are discussed in Dairy Policy Briefs 9b – 9d.  Briefly: 
 
Classified Pricing. Classified pricing establishes monthly minimum pay prices for milk and milk 
components according to what dairy products they are used to produce.  Minimum prices for some 
classes of milk are derived through product price formulas that tie milk prices to market prices for 
products within the class.  Order prices for other classes of milk are not related directly to markets for the 
products included in the class. 
 
Pooling. Pooling is accomplished under federal orders by obligating each regulated handler in the 
marketing area to account for milk receipts according to usage by class.  Handlers pay into or draw from a 
producer settlement fund depending on the order-determined value of their milk receipts priced at order 
minimum prices relative to the market-wide average value (uniform price).  
 
Minimum Prices. Federal orders guarantee producers a minimum price for their milk that is an average 
of the minimum class prices weighted by the proportion of milk used in each class.  Within marketing 
orders, the producer price is the same (for milk of equal quality) regardless of the class of products that 
are made from the producer’s milk.  In seven of the ten FMMOs, producers are paid for pounds of milk 
components (butterfat, protein and other solids), not for pounds of milk.  In the other three orders, 
producers are paid for their deliveries of skim milk and butterfat. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #9b: Federal Milk Marketing Orders—Classification 
 
What is the Program? 
 
Federal milk marketing orders define classes of milk according to end use and set minimum processor 
prices for each class.  Each of the 10 orders uniformly defines four use classes: Class I consists of all 
forms of beverage milk; Class II is perishable manufactured products like cottage cheese, yogurt, and ice 
cream; Class III is hard cheeses; and Class IV is butter and nonfat dry milk.  Class prices are announced 
monthly and apply to milk deliveries for the entire month. 
 
In general, Class I prices are considerably higher than prices for the other three classes.  That’s because 
the Class I price is set by adding a differential to manufacturing class prices. This Class I Differential is 
the same each month, but ranges both within and among FMMO markets from $1.60 per hundredweight 
(Upper Midwest order, Grafton, ND) to $4.30 (Florida order, Miami).  Producer prices, which depend on 
class prices and usage within classes, are positively related to Class I prices and Class I utilization.  Class 
I utilization varies substantially across orders, from less than 20 percent in the Upper Midwest to more 
than 80 percent in Florida, and also seasonally within orders. 
 
Classified pricing is an application of price discrimination.  The price elasticity of demand for dairy 
products differs among classes.  Consequently, producer revenue can be enhanced by shifting milk away 
from products with a relatively inelastic demand (e.g., fluid milk) into products with a relatively elastic 
demand (e.g., butter). 
 
What are the issues? 
 
• Determining the right class.  USDA has a comprehensive system for determining how dairy products 
are assigned to milk classes.  For most dairy products, the classification is straightforward.  But 
classification is not always clear for dairy products that are a complex combination of milk components, 
sometimes in combination with non-dairy ingredients.  For example, some new dairy-based beverages 
have been configured in a way that put them in Class II instead of Class I, which covers other fluid milk 
products.  Producers argued that this caused them to lose the higher Class I value to the extent these 
beverage products compete with other fluid milk.  Producers of these new beverages argued that they 
were expanding total dairy sales to the benefit of producers and that pricing their dairy ingredients at 
Class I would make the products non-competitive. USDA recently issued a proposed rule that uses 
protein content of fluid milk products to help determine classification. 
 
• How many classes?  Are four classes too many?  Not enough?  Some have argued that there should 
be more classes to accommodate new products and to promote export sales.  Others have argued that 
“fine tuning” classification in response to new products is a lost cause, and that the system should be 
simplified by having only two classes—fluid milk products and all manufactured dairy products.    
 
• Changing elasticities.  Enhancing producer revenue through price discrimination/classified pricing 
requires knowledge of relative elasticities.  Past research has consistently shown that the price 
elasticity of demand at retail for fluid milk is smaller in absolute value (more inelastic) than demand for 
manufactured products.  This supports a relatively high price for milk used in fluid products.  But the 
rapid growth in cheese consumption, especially in food ingredient and flavoring uses has made cheese 
demand more inelastic.  At the same time, fluid milk faces more substitutes and there are more and 
more varied fluid products, making demand more elastic.  This raises the question of whether class 
prices are properly aligned. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #9c: Federal Milk Marketing Orders—Pricing 
 
What is the Program? 
 
Federal orders set minimum class prices using a set of formulas.  For Class III and Class IV prices, 
formulas link milk component values directly to wholesale prices for the major dairy products within the 
classes.  For example, the Class III (and Class IV) butterfat formula derives a butterfat price by 
subtracting a make allowance (assumed manufacturing margin) from the wholesale price of butter and 
multiplying the difference by the assumed yield of butter per pound of butterfat.  Protein, nonfat solids, 
and other solids prices are derived in a similar manner, with the values of these components linked to 
wholesale prices for cheese/butter, nonfat dry milk, and dry whey, respectively.  The Class III and Class 
IV prices per hundredweight are calculated by multiplying component prices by the pounds of component 
assumed to be contained in a “standard” hundredweight of milk. 
 
Class I and Class II federal order milk prices are not tied to the wholesale prices of Class I and Class II 
dairy products.  Rather, these prices are set by adding a differential to advanced Class III and Class IV 
prices.  Consequently, prices for all classes of milk are related directly to wholesale prices for butter, 
cheese, dry whey, and nonfat dry milk. 
 
What are the issues? 
 
• Product price formulas.  The product price formulas for Class III and Class IV contain values for 
manufacturing costs and yields that are based on historical industry experience.  Costs and yields vary 
among plants, raising the question of where to draw the line—should the values assure profitability for 
all plants? Only the most efficient plants? The formula values can become outdated over time, leading 
to abnormally high or low plant operating revenue.   This is a particularly serious problem for make 
allowances.  For example, rapidly rising fuel and energy prices in 2005 and 2006 elevated 
manufacturing costs increasingly above the formula make allowances.  But raising product prices in an 
attempt to offset higher costs translates directly into higher milk costs through the Class III and Class IV 
formulas, leaving manufacturers no better off.  And altering make allowances requires a lengthy 
administrative process during which conditions could change radically. Product price formulas rely on 
wholesale prices for dairy products that are collected and reported by USDA’s National Agricultural 
Statistics Service (NASS).  While reporting is mandatory, NASS only requires reporting of prices for 
“spot market” sales, which represent less than 20 percent of butter production and less than 40 percent 
of cheese production.  Moreover, because prices for most butter and cheese transactions are pegged 
to the thinly-traded Chicago Mercantile Exchange markets, even spot market sales prices may not 
consistently reflect broad supply and demand conditions. 
 
• Class I prices.  Minimum Class II, III and IV prices are the same across all orders.  But while the base 
is the same, minimum Class I prices differ because Class I differentials vary across markets.  The 
spread in Class I differentials (measured at principal consumption sites) is from $1.80 to $4.30 per 
hundredweight.  Class I differentials are positively correlated with Class I utilization and, for markets 
east of the Rocky Mountains, distance from the Upper Midwest.  The logic for these differences was to 
encourage local self-sufficiency in fluid milk to avoid costly shipments of inferior milk to meet deficit 
needs. But with rapid transportation and modern packaging technologies, packaged milk can 
economically move long distances with little or no deterioration in quality. Therefore, the need for 
widely-varying Class I prices is questionable and may be contributing to the inefficient location of milk 
production. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #9d: Federal Milk Marketing Orders—Pooling 
 
What is the Program? 
 
Under federal milk marketing orders, producer milk value is determined through pooling.  Simplifying what 
is a complex process, total pool value is calculated by applying minimum class prices to the volume of 
milk used in each of the four classes, I through IV.  Producers affiliated with handlers regulated under the 
order are paid a common price for milk that is equivalent to total pool value divided by total pool volume, 
regardless of how their milk is used.   
 
The terms, pool and pooled, are also used in federal order language to refer to plants that either must or 
may be part of the overall pooling process and to producers eligible to share in the pool distribution.  
Class I handlers within an order marketing area are called pool distributing plants.  These plants are 
required to be pooled, that is, they are obligated to pay minimum Class I prices for the milk they receive.  
For manufacturing plants, called pool supply plants, pooling is optional.  But there is usually an economic 
incentive for doing so because they receive producer settlement fund payments to pay producers. 
 
Producers may ship their milk to any handler and share in the marketing order pool under which the 
receiving handler is regulated.  Dairy cooperatives sometimes “pool” some of their affiliated producers on 
distant markets to take advantage of higher producer prices. 
 
What are the issues? 
 
• Distant pooling.  In most federal order markets, producers receive Class III milk component prices for 
their butterfat, protein and other solids plus a producer price differential (PPD) per hundredweight of 
milk.  The PPD represents the market-wide combined marginal value of other classes of milk relative to 
Class III, and varies positively across markets with Class I prices and utilization. When cooperatives 
pool producers’ milk outside the producers’ marketing area, all of the pooled milk receives the PPD for 
the receiving market.  But not all the milk that is pooled has to be shipped to receive the PPD—the 
shipper need only demonstrate the capability of providing the pooled milk as defined by the receiving 
market’s order qualification standards.  Consequently, there has been a strong incentive to pool milk on 
markets with a relatively high PPD, which increases the volume of pooled milk and decreases the 
average pool value in the receiving order.  Several orders have recently been amended to tighten 
qualification standards in order to reduce economic incentives for distant pooling. 
 
• Depooling.  Because Class I prices are announced six weeks before Class III prices, the monthly 
Class III price infrequently ends up higher than the Class I price.  This “price inversion” means that the 
PPD becomes negative.  It also means that pooled Class III handlers, who normally draw money from 
an order’s producer settlement fund, would have to pay into the fund.  To avoid this payment, Class III 
handlers often depool—disassociate from the order—when there is a price inversion.  The effect of 
depooling is to remove higher-priced milk from the pool, further reducing the PPD.  Some orders have 
been and are being amended to make it more difficult for plants to depool. 
 
• Producer-handlers.  Dairy farmers who package and sell fluid milk exclusively from their own herds 
are exempt from federal order regulations.  There are only a few producer-handlers and most have 
small herds and limited fluid milk sales.  But some exempt producer-handlers have grown large enough 
to materially reduce Class I sales of regulated handlers.  This reduces marketing order pool dollars and 
average milk value to producers.   Recent federal legislation (the Milk Regulatory Equity Act) regulates 
large producer-handlers selling fluid milk in the Arizona-Las Vegas marketing area. 
 
 
